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Michigan tax was on imported inventories held for sale rather
than for use as in the instant case. 15
It is submitted that there is no just basis for allowing immunity to inventories for sale and denying it to those for manufacturing uses. The imported inventories are as essential to
"current operational needs" in the one case as they are in the
other. Imports for sale are as much "used to supply" needed
inventories and therefore "put to the use for which imported"
as are those for manufacturing purposes. In effect the "current
operational needs" test is discriminating against the manufacturer in favor of the seller. As was pointed out by one of the
dissenting Justices in Youngstown 6 there is even less reason
for denying the immunity to goods imported for manufacture
as the state retains the right to tax the manufactured product.
It becomes apparent, therefore, that the cases, by sanctioning
immunity to imports for sale and by denying it to those for
manufacture, have created an unjust dichotomy. The instant
case, although correctly invoking the Youngstown rule, works
unmerited prejudice against the taxpayer merely because he
chooses to use a product to effectuate a later sale rather than to
sell initially.
Paul H. Du6

CRIMINAL LAW-

BILL OF PARTICULARS

A person charged with a criminal offense has a constitutional right to be fully informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.' To secure this right the district attorney may be required to furnish a bill of particulars to the defendant, supplying him with the necessary information. 2 Whether the district attorney must furnish the bill of particulars rests
within the discretion of the trial judge, 3 provided that he may
not arbitrarily refuse to order particulars necessary to the ade15. The tax was held invalid even though the goods were essential to current
operational needs, viz., "to insure the fulfillment of its contracts . . . to supply
said papers with the necessary paper to print said newspapers." Id. at 24, 167
N.W. at 853.
16. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534, 563 (1959).
1. LA. CoNsT. art I, § 10.
2. LA. R.S. 15:235, 288 (1950).
3. State v. Williams, 230 La. 1059, 89 So.2d 898 (1956).
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quate and intelligent preparation of the defense. 4 When abuse
of discretion is shown on appeal, the conviction will be reversed.5
Limitations Upon the Discretion of the Trial Judge
Long Form Indictment
Since the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that the longform indictment 6 state every fact and circumstance necessary
to constitute the offenseJ a proper long-form indictment usually
furnishes the defendant with all the necessary information.8
However, there may be instances in which information vital to
a sound defense is not contained in the indictment; and in such
cases, a bill of particulars should be granted. Thus, where the
crime is one which can occur at different times or places or in
numerous ways, a motion for a bill of particulars should be
granted. 9 If there is an indication that the defendant may have
committed the offense more than once, he may need to know the
occasion on which the state relies not only to prepare his defense
but also to enable him to plead former jeopardy at any subsequent prosecution. 10 Also, even when the crime is one that could
only be committed at one place and in one way," the defendant
4. State v. Dugan, 229 La. 668, 86 So. 2d 528 (1956).
5. State v. Poe, 214 La. 606, 38 So. 2d 359 (1948) (granting of bill rests
in trial judge's discretion; mere refusal not ground for reversal unless prejudice
shown) ; State v. Lewis, 159 La. 109, 105 So. 243 (1925) (same).
6. "Indictment" also refers to bill of information.
7. LA. R.S. 15:227 (1950).
8. State v. Smith, 243 La. 656, 659, 146 So. 2d 152, 153 (1962) : The jurisprudential test of the sufficiency of an indictment charged in the long form is
"whether it contains every element of the offense intended to he charged, and
sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet; and
in case any other proceedings are taken against him for a similar offense,
whether the record shows with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former
acquittal or conviction."
9. State v. Dugan, 229 La. 668, 86 So. 2d 528 (1956). The defendant was
charged with possession and sale of marijuana, by a bill of information following
the language of the statute. He moved for and was denied a bill of particulars
to show the person to whom he had allegedly sold and delivered the drug, and
the alleged time and place of the occurrence.

On appeal

the Supreme

Court

stated that when an accused is charged under the language of a statute which
is so general in its terms that it does not sufficiently inform him of the nature
and cause of the accusation, he should be entitled, upon timely request, to such
details in a bill of particulars. See also State v. Butler, 229 La. 788, 86
So.2d 906 (1956).
10. State v. Larocca, 156 La. 567, 100 So. 720 (1924) (person charged
with the carnal knowledge of a juvenile entitled to bill specifying place of the
commission of the offense by number and street) ; State v. Rollins, 153 La.
10, 95 So. 264 (1922) (defendant charged with possessing intoxicating liquor
for beverage purposes entitled to bill stating time and place of possession and
kind and quantity of liquor).
11. State v. Goodson, 116 La. 388, 40 So. 771 (1906) ; State v. Augusta,
119 La. 896, 7 So. 2d 177 (1942). Both cases indicate that where the crime
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the state to furnish
relying on an alibi should be able to require
2
him with the alleged time of the offense.'
Short-Form Indictment
When the short-form indictment with its simplified form of
accusation is used, the problem of fully informing the defendant becomes more acute. 13 Recognizing this problem, the Louisiana jurisprudence has indicated that, although the determination whether to grant the bill remains in the trial judge's discretion, the court must be extremely liberal when the short form
is employed.' 4 This liberal attitude is compelling since in most
charged is one that could only be committed in one place and generally in one
way, an indictment or bill of information following the language of the statute
is usually held to be sufficient.
12. Comment, 12 LA. L. REV. 457 (1952). In State v. Copling, 242 La.
199, 205, 135 So. 2d 271, 273 (1961), the court stated that "when time is not
of the essence of the crime and the defense is not an alibi, the time stated in
the indictment is immaterial." This seems to indicate that if the defendant
were relying on an alibi, he could require the state to furnish the time of the
offense.
13. A.L.I. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 155, at 71, 83 (official draft, 1931).
The short, simplified form of indictment which dispensed with the necessity
of alleging the particulars of the offense charged was formulated by the
American Law Institute. The Institute also recommended that when the short
form is used the granting of a bill of particulars at the accused's request should
be compulsory in order sufficiently to apprise him of the offense with which
he is charged.
14. In State v. Barnes, 242 La. 102, 134 So. 2d 890 (1961), the Supreme
Court stated that "while the accused is not entitled to a bill of particulars
as a matter of right under these articles, his rights thereunder must be consonant
with the rights guaranteed to him under the constitution that 'in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. . . .' Consequently, whenever the short form indictment is
used, the accused is entitled, upon timely request, to be furnished with a bill
of particulars setting out such matters that are of the essence of the charge
against him and not included in the indictment and any other facts that are
necessary for him to properly and intelligently prepare his defense." Id. at 110,
134 So. 2d at 893. See also State v. Leming, 217 La. 257, 45 So. 2d 262 (1950) ;
State v. Masino, 214 La. 744, 38 So. 2d 622 (1949); State v. Bessar, 213 La.
299, 34 So. 2d 785 (1948) ; State v. Chanet, 209 La. 410, 24 So. 2d 670 (1946).
In State v. Coleman, 236 La. 629, 108 So. 2d 534 (1959), the defendant
was charged with negligent homicide by use of the short-form indictment which
stated, in substance, that the defendant "negligently killed Mrs. Helen Bridges
Hyde, in violation of article 32 of the Louisiana Criminal Code." The defendant
contended that the indictment did not inform him sufficiently of the nature and
circumstances of the accusation because there are many ways in which a person
could be negligently killed by another and many different instrumentalities
which could be used in such killing. The Supreme Court, in allowing the defendant to obtain the information sought, stated that "if the defendant desired
additional information as to the details of the charge for the preparation of
his defense, he was entitled as a matter of right to be furnished with a bill of
particulars." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 634, 108 So. 2d at 536.
In State v. Brooks, 173 La. 9, 136 So. 71 (1931), the defendant had been
indicted under the short form for embezzlement and sought a bill of particulars
to determine the ownership of the property, and the specific relationship of the
accused to the owner of the money. The court, in holding the defendant entitled
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instances the short-form indictment would not adequately inform the defendant of the charge against him.
Limitation Upon the Information Defendant May Demand
When the defendant is found to be entitled to a bill of particulars, there must be certain practical limits as to what he
can demand. Although he is entitled to information absolutely
necessary for the preparation of his defense, the defendant may
not use the bill of particulars as a discovery device to obtain a
preview of the state's evidence. 15 The distinction seems to be
to this information, stated that "the purpose of permitting a bill of particulars
where a short form of indictment is used is to fully protect the accused, indicted
under such form, in his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, and for this reason the provision as to a
bill of particulars, where short forms of indictment are used, should be liberally
interpreted." Id. at 15, 136 So. at 73.
15. A. Louisiana courts have compelled the district attorney to inform the
defendant as to the approximate time and place of the alleged crime. State v.
Howard, 243 La. 971, 149 So. 2d 409 (1963) ; State v. Butler, 229 La. 788,
86 So. 2d 906 (1956) ; State v. Dugan, 229 La. 668, 86 So. 2d 528 (1956);
State v. Bessar, 213 La. 299, 34 So. 2d 785 (1948); State v. Chanet, 209 La.
410, 24 So. 2d 670 (1946) ; State v. Larocca, 156 La. 567, 100 So. 720 (1924).
B. General information as to the circumstances of the alleged crime is usually
required. The state has been required to furnish such information as the
following:
1. Defendant indicted for negligent homicide requested information as to
the cause of death of the alleged victim. The state's answer, "that the death
was the result of an explosion, the cause thereof being the alleged negligent
acts of the defendant," was held sufficient (State v. Masino, 214 La. 744, 38
So. 2d 622 (1949)) ;
2. Defendant charged with simple burglary was entitled to be informed
as to "whether or not the intent of the accused was to commit a forcible
felony or a theft, and if a forcible felony, the nature of it" (State v. Holmes,
223 La. 397, 65 So. 2d 890 (1953));
3. Defendant indicted for theft was entitled to be informed "whether
the theft was committed with the consent of the owner or accomplished
by means of fraudulent conduct, practices or misrepresentations, and if
accomplished without the consent of the owner, the nature and manner in
which the appropriation was accomplished" (State v. Barnes, 242 La. 102,
134 So. 890 (1961). See also State v. Picou, 236 La. 421, 107 So. 2d 691
(1958) ; State v. Gould, 155 La. 639, 99 So. 490 (1924)) ;
4. Defendant indicted for possession and sale of marijuana was entitled
to know the person to whom the alleged sale was made (State v. Butler,
229 La. 788, 86 So. 2d 906 (1956) ; State v. Dugan, 229 La. 668, 86 So. 2d
528 (1956)) ;
C. Particulars were denied in the following cases:
1. In State v. Poe, 214 La. 606, 38 So. 2d 359 (1948), two defendants
charged with the crime of attempted kidnapping were denied particulars
as to the manner in which they allegedly attempted to seize the prosecutrix,
the means or mode by which they attempted to carry her, the part taken
by each defendant in the perpetration of the alleged offense, and the steps
taken by each or either to effect the attempt.
2. In State v. Garrison, 244 La. 787, 154 So. 2d 400 (1963), the defendant, who was charged with the offense of defamation, requested in his application for a bill of particulars to be informed as to the exact words, phrases,
and sentences in the November second statement which the state contended
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drawn between general facts indicating what the state intends
to prove, and details revealing how the state intends to prove

the accusation. The Supreme Court relies heavily on the trial
judge's determination of the category into which defendant's
request falls and will seldom reverse his decision. This is sound

for the distinction is largely one of degree which is difficult to
evaluate on a cold record. 16

The defendant cannot use the bill of particulars as a dilatory
device by requesting information which would be immaterial
and useless in preparation of the defense. Thus in State v. Copling1 7 the court refused to furnish a bill giving the specific dates
upon which promises, threats, or schemes were made by the defendant to entice minor females into prostitution since time was

not an essential element of the crime and the defense was not
relying on an alibi."'

The Louisiana jurisprudence also indicates that the defendant cannot use the bill of particulars to force the state to choose
in advance between responsive verdicts 9 or between permissible
20
alternate lines of proof of the crime charged.

was defamatory or untrue.
3. In State v. Scott, 237 La. 71, 110 So. 2d 530 (1959), defendant was
charged with aggravated rape and requested information as to the circumstances and facts surrounding the commission of the offense, manner of the
acts by either the defendant or complainant in the commission of the offense,
and whether it took place inside a room or at some definite location outside.
See also State v. Michel, 225 La. 1040, 74 So. 2d 207 (1954); State v.
Simpson, 216 La. 212, 43 So. 2d 585 (1949); State v. Fernandez, 157 La.
149, 102 So. 186 (1924).
16. However, in State v. Leming, 217 La. 257, 46 So. 2d 262 (1950), an
accused indicted by the short form for murder was held to be entitled to information not only as to the cause of death, which was poison, but also to be furnished with the chemical analysis report that the state had in its possession.
The chemical analysis report would appear to fall in the category of state's
evidence.
17. 242 La. 199, 135 So. 2d 271 (1961). See also State v. Johnson, 228
La. 317, 82 So. 2d 24 (1955) ; State v. Roshto, 169 La. 251, 125 So. 67 (1929) ;
State v. Gremillion, 137 La. 291, 68 So. 615 (1915); State v. Anderson, 125
La. 779, 51 So. 846 (1910).
18. Other courts have held immaterial to the defense such information as:
(1) type of heroin with which the defendant allegedly dealt. State v. Matassa,
222 La. 363, 62 So. 2d 609 (1952); (2) exact hour and place in the parish
where intoxicating liquor was allegedly sold, quantity of intoxicating liquor
sold and the name of the purchaser. State v. McCall, 162 La. 471, 110 So. 723
(1926) ; (3) exact date and hour that the defendant allegedly committed the
offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. State v. Alford, 206 La.
100, 18 So.2d 666 (1944).
19. State v. Iseringhausen, 204 La. 593, 16 So. 2d 65 (1943).
20. State v. Prince, 216 La. 989, 45 So. 2d 366 (1950); The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1959-1960 Term-Criminal Procedure, 11
LA. L. REv. 233 (1951).
Defendant was charged with attempted aggravated
rape, and the proof was such that a jury might have found either resistance
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Time for Filing Motion for Bill of Particulars
The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the
defendant has a right to' 2 1 file a motion for a bill of particulars
"prior to arraignment," and that the judge cannot entertain
such a motion after the trial has started.12 Although there is
no direct statutory authorization for the granting of a bill of
particulars after arrignment but before trial, the jurisprudence
indicates that the judge may and often should allow the motion
23
during that interval.
In State v. Barnes24 the defendant, who was indicted under
the short form for theft, moved to withdraw his plea of not
guilty in order to file a bill of particulars. The motion was
filed after arraignment and five days before trial. The trial
judge refused the request, stating that the motion was filed
"too late." On appeal, the Supreme Court found "that in refusing to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea of not guilty
in order to file a motion for a bill of particulars for the sole
reason that it was 'too late' in that it was filed after the arraignment was clearly arbitrary and an abuse of discretion."
The court further stated that when the short-form indictment
is used the accused is entitled to a bill of particulars upon
"timely request." The court, however, did not specifically spell
out when a motion is timely. It would appear that the court
was attempting to safeguard the defendant's constitutional
right, but was also guarding against a motion for a bill of particulars so near trial that it was clearly for dilatory purposes.
Under Barnes, therefore, a motion for a bill of particulars
after arraignment is not necessarily untimely; and in order
for the trial judge to deny the motion, he must find that it was
a dilatory tactic or otherwise unsound in addition to being late.
to the utmost (LA.
threats

(LA.

R.S.

R.S. 14:42(1)
14:42(2)

or compliance

(1950)),

(1950)).

The

bill of

as a result of

particulars

asked which

one the state was going to attempt to prove, and the state replied that the
prosecution was under both clauses (1)

and (2)

of article 42 of the Louisiana

Criminal Code. The Supreme Court upheld this by saying that the state did
not have to choose in advance, and so long as the state alleged them in the
conjunctive, it could prove both. Support can be drawn for this from article
222 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure which allows charging of
disjunctive crimes in one count if alternatives are charged in the conjunctive.
21. LA. R.S. 15:235 (1950).
22. Id. 15:288.
23. State v. Barnes, 242 La. 102, 134 So. 2d 890 (1961); State v. Brooks,
173 La. 9, 136 So. 71 (1931); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1961-1962 Term-Criminal Procedure, 23 LA. L. REV. 401 (1963)
Note, 22 LA. L. REv. 676 (1962).
24. 242 La. 102, 134 So. 2d 890 (1961).
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The proposed revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure
being prepared by the Louisiana Law Institute conforms with
the Barnes principle that the defendant's right to a bill of particulars must be fully safeguarded. It gives the defendant a
right to request a bill of particulars "before trial or within ten
days after arraignment, whichever is earlier," and further provides that "after the expiration of the ten day period the
court may permit the filing of such motion until the commencement of trial. '25 By giving the defendant the right to
request a bill of particulars for a specified and reasonable time
after the arraignment, the Supreme Court will have more assurance that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying a delayed motion on the grounds that it was dilatory
in nature; but the rule of the Barnes case should still require
the trial judge to assign his reason for denying a motion after
the ten-day period.
David L. French

DONATIONS -

CAPACITY OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO
ACCEPT DONATIONS MORTIS CAUSA UNDER LOUISIANA LAW

Decedent, a Louisiana domiciliary with no forced heirs, bequeathed all his property to the National Institutes of Health,
Public Health Service, for research into the cure and prevention
of chronic spastic constipation. Decedent's nephew alleged he
was the sole heir and brought suit to invalidate the testamentary
disposition and to obtain an order to distribute the property in
accordance with the law of intestate succession.' The district
court held the will valid, and plaintiff appealed. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal reversed. Held, the United States government, its agencies and subdivisions are not considered "persons" within the meaning of Louisiana Civil Code article 1470,2
and are therefore incapable of receiving a donation mortis causa
25. LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, ExpoSlt DES MOTIFS no. 12, Indictment
and Information tit. XII, art. 24 (March 16, 1962).
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1096 (1870) : "A succession is called intestate when
the deceased has left no will or when his will has been revoked or annulled as
irregular.
"Therefore the heirs to whom a succession has fallen by the effects of law
only, are called heirs ab intestato."
2. Id. art. 1470: "All persons may dispose or receive by donation inter vivos
or mortis causa, except such as the law expressly declares incapable."

